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The Constitutional Right of Self-Representation:
Faretta and the "Assistance of Counsel"
In the landmark case of Faretta v. California,1 the Supreme Court
ended the controversy surrounding the nature of self-representa-
tion. Finding that the right was of constitutional rather than
merely statutory2 dimension and not a matter reserved to the dis-
cretion of the trial court,3 the Court held that the right of self-
representation was independent of the right to counsel. This right
was found implicit in the language and historical background of
the Sixth Amendment. 4 Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the ma-
jority, declared that a state may not force a defendant to accept
counsel against his will if the choice is a "knowing and intelligent"
relinquishment of the benefits associated with the right to counsel.r
The full impact of the constitutional right enunciated in Faretta
has yet to be determined. In addition to discussing the general
right of self-representation, this article will explore both the
changes mandated in the conduct of criminal trials to accommodate
adequate assertion of this right and competing interests in the con-
text of the total criminal justice system.
To better facilitate this discussion, a backdrop of the facts of this
1. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
2. In the federal courts the right of self-representation has been pre-
served from the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and is currently
embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
3. People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 461, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972). This Cal-
ifornia case, holding that the right of self-representation did not have con-
stitutional protection, was overruled by Faretta.
4. 422 U.S. 806, 821.
5. Id. at 836.
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most recent Supreme Court enunciation on self-representation will
be provided. The pertinent facts of Faretta are as follows: An-
thony Faretta requested permission to represent himself "well be-
fore the date of trial,"6 and a waiver was accepted. Several weeks
later and after another examination of the defendant, the trial
judge reversed this ruling, finding that Faretta, lacking legal
knowledge, had not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his
right to counsel; the court also found that Faretta enjoyed no con-
stitutional right to defend himself.7 A public defender represented
Mr. Faretta throughout the trial.
In reversing the lower court, a majority of the U.S. Supreme
Court undertook an extensive review of the history of the right
of self-representation as interpreted in federal and state courts, in
the language and logic of the Sixth Amendment, and in the roots
of British and colonial legal history.8 The Court analogized the
attempt to force unwanted counsel upon a defendant to the Star
Chamber's practice of having a lawyer sign the defendant's answer
to an indictment or considering the failure to have an attorney sign
such answer as a confession.9
Granting that the Court's historical examination of the right of
self-representation reveals a practice of allowing an accused to pre-
sent his own defense, the development of this practice should be
considered in relation to other aspects of criminal law and proce-
dure at common law. At early common law, a prisoner "defended"
himself under myriad disadvantages. 10 First, he was confined so
that he could not prepare a defense. The prosecution conducted
an examination, which was recorded and used against him. The
accused was not furnished with notice of the evidence to be used
against him and was not permitted access to counsel before or dur-
ing the trial. Further, the proceeding was conducted without the
use of evidentiary rules as we know them. The accused could not
confront witnesses nor could he call witnesses on his own behalf.
Confessions of accomplices were not only admissible, but were "re-
6. Id. at 807.
7. Id. at 811.
8. Id. at 821.
9. Id. at 822, n.18.
10. The following practices are enumerated in an examination of the
position of a criminal accused by A.T. Carter. CARTER, A HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH COURTS (6th ed. 1935), 134-135, hereinafter referred to as CARTER.
garded as specially cogent."'" Frankly, it would appear that the
only "right" possessed by a criminal defendant at early common
law was the "privilege" of self-representation to the extent that
the prisoner was permitted to respond to the prosecution's charges
and evidence. 1 2
Reforms in the procedures of British criminal law were relatively
slow. Sir Harry Poland, Q.C., Treasurer of the Inner Temple, in a
lecture given on November 15, 1900,18 touted the reforms of the
nineteenth century. In the Prisoner's Counsel Act of 1836,14 sep-
arate provisions were made for treason, felony and misdemeanor
trials. In the case of high treason, two counsel and the accused
were permitted to address the jury. For a misdemeanor charge,
only one counsel was permitted to address the jury. Where a de-
fendant was accused of a felony, however, counsel's role was limited
to cross-examination of witnesses, argument of points of law, and
examination of witnesses for the defense. The attorney was permit-
ted to write a defense for the accused. Not until Lord Halsbury's
Act of 1898 were an accused and the spouse of an accused permit-
ted to be competent witnesses. 15
By 1758, it was noted that from the late seventeenth or early
eighteenth centuries, "[a] practice also sprang up, the growth of
which cannot be traced, by which counsel were allowed to do every-
thing for prisoners accused of a felony except address the jury for
them."'16 "On the other hand, . . . two years afterwards, [a] pris-
oner was obliged to cross-examine the witnesses without the aid
of counsel . "17
From the foregoing, it appears that a major influence upon the
privilege of self-representation was the exclusion of lawyers from
any proceedings which involved threats against the state's interests.
The prohibitions on the activities of counsel, combined with vague
and restrictive procedural and evidentiary practices, may have been
potent factors in the practice of self-representation. Lawyers on
the scene appear to have gradually changed the procedures to reg-
ulated and more balanced presentations of evidence.
On the other hand, recent American legal history reveals the de-
velopment of the concept that the right to counsel is one element
11. CARTER at 134.
12. See discussion on this area, 54 IINN. L. REV. 1175, 1190-1194 (1970).13. 14 MERSKY & JACOBSTEIN, CLASSICS IN LEGAL HISTORY (1901), herein-
after referred to as MERSKY & JACOBSTEIN.
14. MERSKY & JACOBSTEIN at 50-51.
15. Id. at 54.
16. CARTER at 135.
17. Id.
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essential to securing a fair trial for a defendant in a criminal prose-
cution. Powell v. Alabama,'s Gideon v. Wainwright,9 and Arger-
singer v. Hamlin20 have guaranteed counsel to persons accused of
any charge for which they risk the possibility of loss of liberty.
This has been extended to proceedings involving juveniles,21 to pre-
trial activities of the state,2 2 and to post-trial activities of the state
such as sentencing after a plea of guilty,23 probation revocation,
24
and, in California, to parole rescission. 25 The complexities of crim-
inal procedure, revealed in the decisions of the Supreme Court in
the past two decades,2 6 seem to require a special expertise in this
area, as evidenced by the fact that criminal law is one of three
areas of law for which certification as a specialist is available in
California.27
The Court in Faretta, however, relying heavily on language found
in Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann,28 found that the Constitution does
not force a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant and that freedom
of choice requires a "correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's
18. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Note also the use of Justice Sutherland's oft-
quoted language cited by both the majority (422 U.S. 833, n.43) and minor-
ity (422 U.S. 838-839) pertaining to the necessity for counsel in criminal
proceedings.
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
21. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. See generally Escobedo v. Illinois, 387 U.S. 478 (1964); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
23. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
24. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778 (1973).
25. Gee v. Brown, 14 Cal. 3d 142, 120 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1975).
26. Just a few examples of major significance are the following: Katz
v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Spinelli v. U.S., 394 U.S. 410 (1969); Berger
v. N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967); U.S. v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471
(1963). The subtleties of the search and seizure cases and the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine are enough alone to call for expertise and ex-
perience in this area.
27. The Board of Governors of the State Bar of California has estab-
lished the California Board of Legal Specialization which issues certificates
of specialization upon completion of prescribed requirements. The areas
of law for which specialization certificates are available are criminal, tax
and worker's compensation law.
28. 317 U.S. 269 (1943).
help." Such a right is a correlative of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. 29
The nature of this newly-recognized right appears qualified
rather than absolute. Before the right of self-representation will
be recognized, the defendant must make a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver of the "traditional benefits associated with the right
to counsel."8 0 Additionally, the trial judge "may terminate self-
representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious
and obstructionist misconduct."'1 Implementation of procedures in
the trial courts to fulfill the mandate of Faretta presumably will
be accomplished through development of standards enunciated in
prior decisions recognizing the right of self-representation.
One of the factors necessary to the assertion of the right to de-
fend oneself is a clear and unequivocal demand to do S0.32 For
the defendant's own protection, a full explanation of his rights must
be given to the accused so that he has a clear understanding of
all consequences of his choice.8 3 Justice Douglas' dissent in Adams
v. U.S. ex rel. McCann,3 4 addressing the issue of jury waiver, indi-
cates that before a constitutional right can be intelligently waived,
a defendant should have the benefit of legal advice; this reasoning
applies with equal force to a waiver of the right to counsel. While
this practice has not generally been followed by trial courts, it
would be most beneficial to all concerned if the courts were re-
quired to allow an attorney to explain to a defendant his rights
and the consequences of his choice prior to the court's required ex-
amination of the defendant's competence.
A conditional waiver is not enough to give up the right to counsel
unless the condition is accepted by the court35 nor is the waiver
of joint representation a waiver of the right to independent coun-
sel. 30 The value placed upon the right to counsel in our legal sys-
29. 422 U.S. at 814.
30. Id. at 835.
31. Id. at 834, n.46.
32. See U.S. ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
See also U.S. ex rel. Higgins v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1966).
33. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948). The court in this case
indicated that the explanation would vary according to the nature of the
charges and the defendant's own demeanor, but as a minimum it should
include the nature of the charges, statutory offenses which are included
in those charges, the range of allowable punishments, possible defenses
and/or factors in mitigation. The investigation should be as long and as
thorough as is required for a complete understanding by the defendant of
all aspects of his waiver.
34. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
35. People v. Carter, 66 Cal. 2d 666, 58 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1967).
36. People v. Douglas, 61 Cal. 2d 430, 38 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1964).
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tern has required courts in the past to determine that an accused
understands the nature of the charge, the elements of the offense,
the pleas and defenses which may be available and the punishments
which may be exacted. 7 The courts, too, have "indulged every rea-
sonable presumption against waiver" of such a fundamental right.8 8
No waiver can be accepted unless it is a knowing and intelligent
relinquishment of guaranteed rights;8 9 such a determination re-
quires a "consideration of the nature of the charge, the facts and
circumstances of the case, and the education, experience, mental
competence and conduct of the accused. '40 In U.S. v. Dougherty,41
the court stated that the right to defend pro se was conditioned
upon a timely assertion of the right as well as an intelligent waiver
of the right to counsel.
It has also been stated that competence to waive counsel does
not require that the accused exhibit the knowledge or training of
a lawyer nor need he be cognizant of the rules of law by which
he will be bound in the conduct of his trial.42 Even an inadequate
waiver of the right to counsel coupled with an assertion of the right
to defend pro se may not be prejudicial (and any such defect will
be cured) where an accused actually conducts his defense as com-
petently as any layman.43
If, as stated in Faretta, a competent waiver of counsel is required,
then the trial court should retain discretion to deny the right of
self-representation to an "incompetent" defendant. In the past, the
court could examine the defendant's conduct and demeanor to deter-
mine whether or not a defendant had the ability to make an intelli-
gent waiver of counsel and had the competency to represent himself
37. In Re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302, 313, 240 P.2d 596, 603 (1952).
38. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
39. See In re James, 38 Cal. 2d 302, 313, 240 P.2d 596, 603 (1952); People
v. Shroyer, 203 Cal. App. 2d 478, 21 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1962); People v. Ches-
ser, 29 Cal. 2d 815, 178 P.2d 761 (1947); People v. Kemp, 55 Cal. 2d 458,
11 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1961); People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937
(1959).
40. People v. Butcher, 174 Cal. App. 2d 722, 726, 345 P.2d 127, 130 (1959).
41. 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. 1972).
42. See People v. Addison, 256 Cal. App. 2d 18, 63 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1968);
People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959); People v. Linden,
52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397 (1959); People v. Terry, 224 Cal. App. 2d 415,
36 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1964).
43. People v. Kranhouse, 265 Cal. App. 2d 440, 448, 71 Cal. Rptr. 223,
228 (1968).
at trial.44 A recent decision of the California Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, interpreting this aspect of Faretta is People v.
Brown.45 The court in Brown distinguished the denial of self-rep-
resentation in Faretta from that in Brown on the ground that the
denial of the right to Faretta was based solely upon his lack of
legal knowledge, while Brown's demand for self-representation was
not within the scope of the standards set forth in Faretta because
it was not timely. 46 The motion was made the day before trial
and only after a proposed disposition had been rejected by the dis-
trict attorney. In addition, the court found no competent waiver
by the defendant. This was based not solely upon a lack of legal
knowledge, but on the age, background, experience and demeanor
of the accused. He showed a lack of comprehension or ability to
comprehend the nature of the waiver of counsel and displayed a
lack of common sense.47
Whether this view of the discretion of a trial court to deny self-
representation will prevail depends ultimately upon the emphasis
given to the free choice of the accused in this decision, even where
it will result in an obvious detriment to him. The Court in Faretta
emphasized that Faretta was "literate, competent and understand-
ing, and that he was voluntarily exercising his informed free
will."4 s A balance of interests based upon the totality of circum-
stances in a particular case may well be the test utilized to deter-
mine whether an "intelligent" free choice is made by a "competent"
defendant.
Given a competent defendant making an informed and intelligent
choice to defend himself, what then is meant by the Sixth Amend-
ment right to the "Assistance of Counsel?" The majority in Faretta
speaks of a choice between representing oneself and being repre-
sented by a lawyer. Is there necessarily such a dichotomy?
California cases prior to People v. Sharp,49 overruled by Faretta,
44. People v. Shields, 232 Cal. App. 2d 716, 722, 43 Cal. Rptr. 188, 192-
193 (1965).
45. 51 Cal. App. 3d 284, 124 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1975). This case was ac-
cepted for hearing by the California Supreme Court in November, 1975.
46. Id. at 294, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 136. The requirement of a timely de-
mand was not specifically delineated in Faretta, but earlier cases (cited
herein) have indicated that such a requirement may be within the discre-
tion of the trial court.
47. Id. at 295, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 136. One of the reasons for finding
a lack of "knowing and intelligent" waiver of counsel was that the accused
here knew "very little" about his case, and his asserted grounds for dismiss-
ing counsel were "vague and unsupported generalities."
48. 422 U.S. at 835.
49. 7 Cal. 3d 448, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
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recognized a right of self-representation and appeared to regard the
right to defend oneself as an alternative to representation by coun-
sel.5" In People v. Mattson, the court stated that "a defendant is
not entitled to have his case presented in court both by himself
and by counsel acting at the same time or alternating at defendant's
pleasure." 51 [Emphasis supplied by the court.] Recognizing that
a defendant could not be forced to accept representation of counsel
and maintaining that this was an election of "either/or" conse-
quences, the court in Mattson also acknowledged the difference be-
tween the right to employ private counsel "in an inferior position
in the defense" and the power of the trial court in its discretion
to:
... permit a party who is represented by counsel to participate
in the conduct of the case, or permit a defendant who appears
in propria persona to employ an attorney to sit by him and advise
him during the presentation of the case in court, or even appoint
an attorney (with the latter's consent) to render such advisory
services to an indigent defendant who wishes to represent him-
self.52
In People v. Linden, the court in midtrial, upon defendant's re-
quest, relieved "counsel as attorney of record and, with his consent
and with express recognition of the difficult position in which he
was placed, appointed him as legal advisor."58 The defendant pro-
ceeded pro se. In People v. Bourland, the court was dissatisfied
with the ability of the accused to defend himself, and "requested
and secured the assent" of the assistant public defender to assist
the defendant as an agent or arm of the court. 4 This action was
found entirely within the scope of the trial court's discretionary
powers. In People v. Ruiz, the court maintained the position, con-
sistent with the foregoing authorities, that where a defendant
waives the right to counsel's representation, "he is in no position
to demand legal assistance during the trial."55
50. See generally People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959);
People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397 (1959); People v. Thomas,
58 Cal. 2d 121, 23 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1962); People v. Bourland, 247 Cal. App.
2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1966); People v. Ruiz, 263 Cal. App. 2d 216, 69
Cal. Rptr. 473 (1968).
51. 51 Cal. 2d at 789, 336 P.2d at 946.
52. Id. at 797, 336 P.2d at 951.
53. 52 Cal. 2d at 16, 338 P.2d at 403.
54. 247 Cal. App. 2d at 81, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
55. 263 Cal. App. 2d at 223, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 477. See also Comment,
Prior to Faretta, therefore, the decisions indicate that while a de-
fendant has no right to demand advisory counsel upon electing to
represent himself, the court in its discretion may permit the ac-
cused, even where represented by counsel, to participate actively
in the case if this would promote the ends of justice and not hinder
or delay the "orderly and expeditious conduct of the court's busi-
ness."16 They further indicate that a court may, additionally or
alternatively and upon a showing of good cause, appoint counsel
in an advisory capacity where the defendant requests such assist-
ance and where such appointment will serve the interests of jus-
tice.57 These earlier decisions indicate that the consent of counsel
is required since the lawyer is surrendering his traditional role of
advisor to assume a subservient role.58
On the other hand, the role of advisory counsel was held to be
encompassed within the duties imposed upon the public defender
by statute59 and, thus, the appointment of the public defender to
render services in an advisory capacity may be found to be within
the scope of the public defender's duties.60 In Ligda v. Superior
Court of Solano County, the court did not resolve the issue of
whether the consent of the public defender was necessary.61 It was,
however, stated:
The fact that the public defender is a public officer, acting
by deputy, does not institutionalize the representation. Once a
deputy has appeared as counsel in a cause, the court may retain
him before.the court in such a matter .... Having the right and
duty to assign the defense to the public defender, the court has
the power to assign him to serve for the more limited included
function of advising and assisting. 2
The legislative intent in the progressive expansion of the du-
ties of the public defender [citations omitted] seems clear. The
purpose is, to keep pace with the progressive requirements of due
process of law, declared in the decisions of our Supreme Courts,
in providing counsel for indigent defendants. The word "de-
fense" is clearly to be interpreted as embracing "the Assistance
Self-Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of the Pro Se De-
fendant, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1479 (1971), which advocates that both self-repre-
sentation and counsel's assistance are separate and independent constitu-
tional rights and that both should be afforded to a defendant.
56. People v. Darling, 58 Cal. 2d 15, 20, 22 Cal. Rptr. 484, 487 (1962).
57. 51 Cal. 2d at 797, 336 P.2d at 951; 247 Cal. App. 2d at 86-87, 55
Cal. Rptr. at 36-37.
58. See 51 Cal. 2d at 793, 336 P.2d at 949.
59. CAL. GOVT. CODE, § 27706 (a) (West, 1968).
60. Ligda v. Superior Court of Solano County, 5 Cal. App. 3d 811, 85
Cal. Rptr. 744 (1970).
61. Id. at 817, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 747.
62. Id. at 823, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 751.
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of Counsel for his defence" as specified in the Sixth Amendment.
That assistance clearly embraces more than control of the case in
formal proceedings. 63
• . . [I]t has aptly been held that the public defender has all the
powers and privileges for his client that would exist in respect
to any private employment of counsel ...
But the public defender as a ministerial officer of the court
does not have the power to decline an assignment to defend or
any function thereof, as if he were a private attorney. He is em-
ployed by the people to render such services. 64
Apparently, the role of advisory counsel would fall within the
scope of Faretta. Footnotes in the majority opinion and in the Chief
Justice's dissent indicate that the courts have inherent powers to
appoint an attorney either as "standby" counsel or as the traditional
"friend of the court" to aid the accused and to be available to as-
sume representation of the defendant should that necessity arise.65
There was no indication in Faretta, however, that advisory counsel,
as such, was required under the provision for "Assistance of Coun-
sel" in the Sixth Amendment. It would seem, nevertheless, that
the appointment of standby counsel over the objection of the ac-
cused would not be within the contemplation of the right to counsel
and would be subject to the same arguments that prohibit the state
from forcing unwanted counsel on the accused. The only conceiv-
able function of standby counsel would be that of amicus curiae
with no relationship to the accused. This limited role would be
relevant here only if the defendant loses his right to defend pro
se as, for example, by disruptive tactics. Standby counsel could
be available in that case to represent the defendant midtrial with-
out a total disruption of the proceedings.
Whether or not advisory counsel is available to an accused in a
criminal proceeding, it appears that the consequences of an election
to represent oneself are severe. A defendant who chooses to forego
representation by counsel cannot be heard later to complain of the
quality of the defense presented. 66 While a defendant need not
have the "acumen or the learning of a skilled lawyer" 67 to assert
63. Id. at 825, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
64. Id. at 827, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
65. 422 U.S. at 834, n.46; 422 U.S. at 846, n.7.
66. Id. at 834, n.46.
67. See People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397 (1959); People v.
Harmon, 54 Cal. 2d 9, 4 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1960).
his right of self-representation, once such an election is made the
defendant will be bound by his choice; he "assumes for all purposes
connected with his case, and must be prepared to be treated as hav-
ing, the qualifications and responsibilities concomitant with the role
he has undertaken."8 Failure to comply with the rules of evidence
will not be excused because of ignorance,89 because "a defendant
who chooses to represent himself assumes the responsibilities inher-
ent in the role which he has undertaken. ' 70 Also a defendant act-
ing as his own attorney
does not lose the status of prisoner and become entitled to extra-
ordinary privileges not accorded defendants who are represented
by counsel, nor does he become entitled to proceed in a manner
different from that permitted to attorneys.7 1
He retains the status of a defendant and does not attain that of
"an attorney of law who is an officer of the court and responsible
to it. 172 The restriction of activity or movement in the courtroom
is thus justified.
Once a competent election is made by a defendant "prior to or
at the commencement of his trial, [he] is not entitled thereafter
to interrupt and delay the hearing at any stage he deems advan-
tageous merely to interpose a demand for legal assistance. '73 The
right to counsel or of self-representation may be "invoked only in
the course of orderly procedures. ' 74 The exercise of these rights
is subject to the regulation and control of the court, and it may
not be used for delay or to subvert or disrupt the "orderly and effi-
cient administration of justice." '75 The right to free choice encom-
passes the requirement that a defendant be aware of these conse-
quences so that he may know what he is doing and make a choice
with his eyes wide open.78 Thus, regardless of the quality of rep-
resentation required of an attorney, 77 a defendant apparently
68. People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959); People v.
Harmon, 54 Cal. 2d 9, 4 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1960).
69. People v. Robinson, 62 Cal. 2d 889, 44 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1965); People
v. Bourland, 247 Cal. App. 2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1966).
70. 62 Cal. 2d at 894, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
71. People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 174, 238 P.2d 1001, 1006 (1951).
72. 38 Cal. 2d at 176, 238 P.2d at 1007.
73. People v. Thomas, 58 Cal. 2d 121, 131-32, 23 Cal. Rptr. 161, 166-67(1962).
74. People v. Loving, 258 Cal. App. 2d 84, 65 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1968).
75. 258 Cal. App. 2d at 87, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
76. Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-469 (1938); People v. Ruiz, 263 Cal. App. 2d
216, 225, 69 Cal. Rptr. 473, 478-479 (1968).
77. See People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963) where
relief was granted to a defendant under the "farce or sham" standard of
competent representation by counsel. Rejecting this standard, Beasley v.
[VOL. 3: 336, 1976] Right of Selfrepresentation
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
stands alone with respect to his efficacy in trial when he elects to
proceed without counsel.
The above consequences of self-representation, however, do not
mean that a defendant pro se is entitled to any less than an attor-
ney. A reasonable amount of time to prepare for trial is as funda-
mental as the right to counsel,78 and it is a denial of due process
to refuse a reasonable continuance so that a defendant pro se may
be afforded the opportunity to prepare a defense to the charges
lodged against him.
The role of judge and prosecutor may be affected profoundly by
the accused's election to defend himself. A judge's role is presumed
to be that of an impartial arbiter; it would be inappropriate to this
role to have the trial court assist the defendant with the intricacies
of law. It is also the duty of the court to contain the evidence
to the charges and defenses. On the other hand, the courts are com-
mitted under our legal system to the concept of justice and the re-
quirements of due process through a "fair" trial. The prosecutor's
objective, mandated by legal ethics and the value system under
which we operate, is to seek justice rather than to obtain a convic-
tion at any cost. The difficulties inherent in the concept of active
advocacy by "equal" opponents to determine the guilt or innocence
of an accused may invoke psychological fetters to active advocacy
and impartial justice for a defendant unable to cope with the legal
intricacies of criminal procedure. As the Chief Justice's dissent in
Faretta79 points out, the goal of justice and the public's confidence
in the integrity of the judicial system could be undermined by the
inability of a defendant to secure an adequate defense.80
The assumption that the defendant pro se will be bound totally
by his choice is perhaps too glib a response to a complex question.
U.S., 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) sets a higher standard. Such standard
would require that "counsel must perform at least as well as a lawyer with
ordinary training and skill in the criminal law and must conscientiously
protect his client's interest undeflected by conflicting considerations. De-
fense counsel must investigate all apparently substantial defenses available
to the defendant and must assert them in a proper and timely manner."
78. People v. Maddox, 67 Cal. 2d 647, 63 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1967); People
v. Mendez, 260 Cal. App. 2d 302, 67 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1968).
79. 422 U.S. at 839.
80. See also Justice Blackmun's dissent (422 U.S. at 849) speaking of
the injury to society's interests in the procuring of an unjust result because
of a defendant who inadvisedly or for "whimsical" reasons seeks to defend
pro se.
Where a record reveals total inability to respond to serious charges
and where prejudicial evidence is erroneously admitted without ob-
jection, a herculean challenge will be presented to an appellate
court who will have to balance the integrity of the total judicial
system against the defendant's choice to be bound by his errors.
Not all of these errors can be construed as "harmless" in the con-
text of the overall system. Many defendants who proceed alone
may, of course, be sufficiently intelligent and conversant with most
aspects of criminal law to present a fairly adequate defense to the
charges. The greatest problem will arise where for personal, politi-
cal or psychological reasons a defendant by an objective standard
lacks the necessary experience or awareness of the procedures and
issues involved to adequately represent himself, yet adamantly in-
sists upon presenting his own defense to his detriment.
A parallel problem and one which often promotes a desire for
self-representation is the inability of an indigent defendant to se-
cure counsel of his choice. It is a denial of due process to deny
to a defendant a reasonable continuance to obtain a lawyer of his
own choosing81 or to deny association of out-of-state counsel in
whom a defendant reposes his personal confidence 82 where counsel
is retained. Where counsel is appointed by the court and paid for
by public funds, however, "constitutional and statutory guarantees
are not violated by the appointment of an attorney other than one
requested by a defendant. '8 3 Furthermore, unless the representa-
tion is a "farce or sham, '8 4 counsel in the control of court proceed-
ings and trial tactics may waive a defendant's rights even without
informing him of such waiver.85 For the indigent there is no consti-
tutional right to counsel who will conduct the defense according
to the defendant's "whims"8 0 unless a "legitimate difference of opin-
ion develops between a defendant and his appointed counsel as to
a fundamental trial tactic."'8" Perhaps a right to articulate specific
grievances and obtain alternative counsel would relieve some of the
distrust and lack of confidence experienced by indigent defendants
upon having counsel appointed in whom they repose no faith.
81. People v. Crovedi, 65 Cal. 2d 199, 53 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966).
82. Magee v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 949, 506 P.2d 1023 (1973).
83. Drumgo v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007 (1973). See
also TAGUE, An indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 73 (1974).
84. 60 Cal. 2d at 464, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 863 (1963).
85. People v. Hill, 67 Cal. 2d 105, 114, 60 Cal. Rptr. 234, 240 (1967).
86. People v. Nailor, 240 Cal. App. 2d 489, 494, 49 Cal. Rptr. 616, 620
(1966).
87. People v. Moss, 253 Cal. App. 2d 248, 251, 61 Cal. Rptr. 107, 110
(1967).
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One question which remains unanswered by Faretta is the time
at which the right of self-representation attaches. Must a person
prior to custodial interrogation be informed that he has the right
to counsel"" or that he may elect to represent himself? Must this
notice of election be given at lineups,8 9 showups 90 or other pretrial
encounters with the state?91 The courts will undoubtedly be called
upon to resolve the issue of whether the election may be revoked,
and, if so, when counsel may be substituted for a defendant pro
se. Presumably, the outcome will depend upon whether, under all
the circumstances of a particular case, it would be fundamentally
unfair to require a defendant who has become aware of his inade-
quacy in a criminal proceeding to be bound by his earlier election
to proceed alone.
The right of self-representation will give the defendant the right
to conduct his own defense. His role as counsel will not affect his
role as defendant or prisoner except that he will have the opportu-
nity to research in the prison library and will have access to other
aids needed to present his defense. A defendant pro se will be held
to the standards of an attorney in conducting his defense and will
receive no greater consideration in the conduct of his trial than a
lawyer nor will he be accorded any greater privileges in court than
would be accorded a defendant represented by counsel. Possible
disadvantages of his role as defender are a lack of legal training
and experience, a loss of the other benefits associated with the right
to counsel, and the propriety of arguing his own credibility. On
the other hand, there are some possible advantages to an articulate
and intelligent defendant. He may argue to the jury without tak-
ing the stand and being subjected to cross-examination or impeach-
ment provided, of course, that he is able to obtain other evidence
from which to argue. He may exert control over his own defense
and will not be bound by decisions of counsel acting in opposition
to his own views as to the merits of his defense. For a defendant
88. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
89. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967).
90. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
91. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), wherein it was stated that
the right to counsel attaches at or after the time adversary judicial proceed-
ings have been initiated against an accused.
whose experience and intelligence is adequate for the task, these
advantages may be most persuasive.
There are limitations on the right of self-representation. Its as-
sertion will not be tolerated as a device to delay or abuse the legal
system. If excessive time is consumed, the defense may be cut short
or limited to relevant issues. The use of the courtroom as a political
forum may be found irrelevant to the proceedings at hand, thus
foreclosing any benefit of self-representation to the political defend-
ant. Additionally, any disruption of the orderly process of the trial
will be cause for termination of the right.
The right of self-representation will undoubtedly call for a re-
evaluation of the Sixth Amendment right to "Assistance of Coun-
sel." As with other aids9 2 which have been found necessary to pro-
vide a defendant with a fair trial, perhaps the role of counsel will
be expanded to encompass advice and other assistance to a defend-
ant pro se, if he so desires. If not, the newly-acquired right may
well prove to be a constitutional right to make a fool of oneself.9 3
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92. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971).
93. 422 U.S. at 852.
